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A Layman's Guide to Structural Adjustment 
Introduction 
This paper provides a non-technical review of the basic 
issues related to structural adjustment (SA). It focuses on the 
economic aspects of SA, attempting to make these intelligible to 
non-economists. It begins with a thumbnail sketch of SA: its 
definition and origin and the principal features of the programs 
recommended by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
The main body of the paper then examines some of the principal 
controversies in three areas: first, the broad assumptions 
underlying SA programs; second, the percentage of aid allocated 
to SA; and third, some features of program implementation. Some 
alternatives to the Bank/Fund approach to SA are briefly 
examined and the paper concludes by looking at some issues which 
have been neglected but merit greater attention. 
What is Structural Adjustment? 
Structural adjustment in the general sense is the process 
of deliberately adjusting the structure of an economy to mitigate 
the effects of negative shocks or to take advantage of new 
opportunities. These shocks and opportunities can be external or 
domestic in origin. In fact most adjustment has been defensive 
in nature, adjusting to negative external shocks, but some, for 
example that practised by some of the East Asian newly 
industrialized countries (NIC's) has been positive, taking 
advantage of new opportunities in the international economy. 
This notion of SA is not controversial. It is widely accepted 
that economies must adapt to change. It is only the nature of 
that adaptation that is subject to disagreement. 
Of particular interest is the type of SA recommended by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund and which forms the 
subject of this paper. This kind of adjustment began around 
1980 in response to balance of payment problems experienced by 
countries in Africa, Latin America and some regions of Asia. 
The precise causes of the crisis are subject to some debate. 
They appear to lie principally in a series of external shocks 
that occurred during the 1970s. In 1974 the first oil price hike 
caused a large negative shock which was followed in 1975 by a 
boom in commodity prices. That led to large increases in 
consumption and investment which could not be sustained when in 
1979 oil prices again increased, a world recession occurred and 
world interest rates rose. In Latin America, the negative 
consequences of these cycles were first softened and then later 
exacerbated by heavy borrowing. This crisis made itself felt in 
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shortages of foreign exchange with which to purchase imports, 
imports needed both for direct consumption and for investment in 
industry and agriculture. This was often accompanied by 
hyperinflation in Latin America and negative rates of growth in 
Africa. 
In keeping with its traditional role of providing short-term 
finance to smooth out balance of payment problems, the IMF 
provided loans designed to help countries to meet their import 
bills and to stabilize the economy. The stabilization programs 
were designed to reduce inflation by reducing demand; this in 
turn was achieved by lowering real wages and cutting government 
expenditures. This limited short-term financial objective was 
seen as necessary to get the economy functioning again. When 
inflation is running at 300%, little productive investment takes 
place. The Fund had always provided such loans, but in the early 
1980's they became much more frequent. 
The World Bank became more involved in policy-based lending 
similar to the Fund's around 1982 when it was recognized that the 
problem was long-term, that demand reduction alone wasn't enough 
and that changes in the structure of the economy were required to 
get out of the serious and prolonged economic crisis. The Bank 
also felt that policies needed more attention and had been one of 
the causes of the problem in the first place. It was also the 
experience of Bank staff that good projects were in short supply, 
particularly in Africa, and could not handle the rapid 
disbursements needed to keep the most affected economies afloat. 
Structural adjustment loans designed for this purpose comprised 
about 10% of the Bank's funding around 1982 but as of 1989 
comprised 25% of total Bank lending, and 50% of it in Africa. 
The main elements of the Bank/Fund approach are well known 
and don't require detailed explanation. The first element is 
austerity, reducing aggregate demand and government expenditure. 
By reducing domestic consumption, more goods can be exported to 
pay for essential imports. The second is reliance on the 
market to set prices rather than government price controls. This 
includes the price of foreign exchange and large devaluations 
play a major role in those programs. -The third is privatization 
or a reduced role for the government in the economy. This 
involves selling off public enterprises or requiring them to 
operate under private sector performance criteria. In general, 
the private sector is expected to take on more of the functions 
previously performed by the State. 
The purpose of these programs is to provide finance for a 
transition period. The economic policies and structures of the 
1970s are seen as unsustainable. A crisis then resulted when 
those structures were subjected to external shocks. That crisis 
needed resolution through a transition to a more sustainable 
economic structure. In the long run this should be beneficial 
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but in the short run these changes are painful and subject the 
economy to low or negative growth, increased unemployment and so 
on. The purpose of the programs is to provide finance during 
that transition period. (However, it is unclear to what extent 
these programs simply provide balance of payment support linked 
to broad macro conditionality versus the extent to which they 
cover the specific adjustment costs of transition.) 
Some Controversies over Structural Adjustment 
A. Broad Assumptions 
The most important assumption underlying the structural 
adjustment programs of the Bank/Fund is the role of the state. 
In the view of these organizations and most conservative 
economists, markets provide the best means of efficiently 
allocating resources. Prices simultaneously provide signals 
about scarcities and incentives for producers to fill those 
scarcities. The alternate view is that markets have 
imperfections and will not in themselves result in an optimal 
long run allocation of resources and perhaps not even a good 
allocation in the short run. Information, especially about long 
run trends, is not perfect. Prices are volatile and 
unpredictable and monopolies and lack of entrepreneurship prevent 
the private sector from providing effective competition. In this 
view, government must play a role in allocating resources, 
directing investment and distributing income. 
This debate has lasted many decades and shows no sign of 
been resolved. Conservatives argue that while markets may be 
imperfect, government is even more imperfect; they believe their 
views are vindicated by the recent liberalization in Eastern 
Europe. No effort is made to resolve the controversy here, but 
this issue receives more attention in the latter part of the 
paper. 
A second basic assumption is the diagnosis of the causes of 
the economic crisis that necessitated structural adjustment. 
Most observers will probably agree that the crisis resulted from 
three factors: external shocks, weaknesses in the domestic 
structure of the economy (e.g. dependency on a single export) and 
flaws in domestic policies. Disagreement arises over how much 
weight to give to each of these factors. The World Bank gives 
most emphasis to domestic policies while developing country 
governments tend to emphasize external shocks. 
The debate over external versus internal origins of the 
crisis may have received more attention than it merits. For one 
thing, the external vs. internal dichotomy is often used 
incorrectly to justify foreign aid. (I.e. if the crisis is 
external then aid is justified, if it is internal then it is 
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not.) However if the aim of this line of argument is to 
identify responsibility as lying with the domestic government or 
not, a better criterion, as Streeten points out, is whether or 
not the shock was predictable. Many terms of trade shocks are 
predictable (at least current policy makers should not expect 
precipitative commodity price rises to last forever) while some 
domestic events such as climatic disasters are not predictable or 
controllable. Furthermore, it should be obvious that it is the 
interaction among these three causes which cause the crisis. 
Fred Bienefeld has used the metaphor of piling bricks on top of a 
cardboard box. When the box finally collapses, was it the fault 
of the bricks or the weak cardboard box? Obviously the question 
is not particularly meaningful even for policy: action is needed 
on all fronts. Improvements in the international economic 
environment are required and pressure should be applied to those 
bodies which can influence that environment. At the same time if 
developing country policy makers simply wait for those 
improvements and do nothing to adapt to those shocks, they may 
well be crushed in the meantime. 
B. The Allocation of Aid to SA 
How much of a country or aid agency's budget should go into 
structural adjustment is an important policy question. CIDA has 
recently announced that it intends to increase the proportion of 
its aid going into SA while the World Bank has informally 
indicated that it will likely return to a larger proportion of 
traditional project lending. Has the shift to more policy-based 
lending and less project aid over the last decade been a positive 
development? 
There is fairly widespread agreement that the emphasis on 
project aid in the 1970s and earlier was probably excessive, for 
a variety of reasons that are well elaborated in the literature. 
Recurrent costs and counterpart contributions were too high for 
governments to afford in many cases. Tied aid was a problem; 
disbursements were too slow to meet the financial needs of 
countries in crisis in the 1980s; and bad policies tended to 
undermine the effectiveness of individual projects. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that developed countries and the 
Asian NIC's did not prosper through aid projects but rather 
through sound economic policies. 
In principle then, policy-based lending should be superior 
to project lending. In practice it has some weaknesses. The 
costs of negotiating and monitoring the agreements tend to be 
extremely high due to the very specific and detailed nature of 
the conditionality involved. In fact most developing country 
governments spend so much time negotiating and reporting on these 
programs that they have no time to devote to any other aspect of 
economic policy. Policy-based lending also requires a great deal 
of macroeconomic expertise in both the donor and the recipient, 
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far more than the relatively limited expertise required to do a 
cost-benefit analysis of a project. Few donors or recipients 
have the required expertise to design effective country-specific 
programs and this in part explains the "standardized recipe" 
employed in most SAPs and the heavy reliance on the market. 
C. Implementation Problems 
1. The most obvious aspect of implementation to be assessed is 
its effectiveness. What have structural adjustment programs 
accomplished over the last ten years? Although the experience 
with SAPs is by now widespread, the evidence is not conclusive. 
Some individual countries have done relatively well, but these 
generally involved large amounts of aid which will eventually 
have to be paid back. Most countries have improved their balance 
of payments performance though much of this, particularly in 
Africa, comes from reducing imports rather than increasing 
exports. Latin American export performance has been quite good, 
however, and many Latin American economies have been able to 
grow at respectable rates. Unfortunately much of this growth 
goes into debt repayment. 
In general, the Bank/Fund approach has not been 
conspicuously successful. In Africa one sees individual success 
stories but not much improvement across the continent. Growth is 
still stagnant or negative after nearly ten years of structural 
adjustment. These programs were supposed to provide a quick fix 
- a three to five year adjustment after which economic growth 
could be resumed. That so little progress that has been made 
after ten years must surely be a source of disappointment both to 
the Bank and the Fund and to developing countries. 
2. Conditionality is an important part of structural 
adjustment. In order to receive loans, countries must agree to 
meet a series of very detailed, time-specific targets. Further 
disbursements will not be made unless these targets are met. 
Furthermore, some of the targets are only indirectly related to 
the overall goals of the program and targets such as privatizing 
public enterprises which might be seen as a means to a goal of 
reducing the fiscal deficit, sometimes appear to be ends in 
themselves. Because of the heavy ideological component of some 
of these targets and the enormous amount of time that goes into 
negotiating, reporting and monitoring their achievement, many 
critics argue that conditionality should involve longer and 
looser deadlines and more aggregate targets, with more 
responsibility being left to the country as to how and when to 
meet them. Rather than monitoring performance on a large number 
of specific activities it would be better to monitor the overall 
results. 
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However, countries which advocate this approach should be 
aware of a possible inconsistency with another of their 
frequently voiced requests. It is often advocated that the 
agreement make specific allowance for non-performance caused by 
exogenous factors. For example, Mexico managed to negotiate a 
clause which partially linked its debt repayment to the world 
price of oil. If Mexico's oil export revenues decline it would 
not be expected to repay as much debt. It is probably not 
consistent to argue that exogenous and endogenous causes of non- 
performance should be separated, while simultaneously asking that 
performance be assessed on the basis of ultimate goals rather 
than specific indicators. 
Another consideration with respect to conditionality is the 
degree to which it impinges on national sovereignty. Do the Bank 
and the Fund have the right to tell governments what to do? This 
is indeed a serious question but must be treated with some degree 
of realism. For example, whose sovereignty is impinged upon? 
That of "the government"? "The people"? Would anyone argue that 
the governments of all developing countries actually reflect the 
will of their people? one of the effects of structural 
adjustment should be to redistribute income from government 
bureaucrats to producers. Bureaucrats can logically be expected 
to resist this and when they do so it may be a defense of their 
own interests as much as a defence of national sovereignty. 
Furthermore, much of the public Bank-bashing which goes on is 
simply playing to a domestic audience. In many cases 
governments want to take strong action against domestic lobbies 
but lack the political clout to do so. By saying that they were 
forced into a particular action by external pressure and blaming 
the action on a scapegoat, they may be able to carry out 
politically difficult decisions which they could not have 
implemented otherwise. The Bank and the Fund are well aware of 
this and are willing to play along in order to get their 
recommendations implemented. 
3. The timing. sequencing and pace of adjustment is another 
area of controversy. The Bank and the Fund favour simultaneous, 
uniform and immediate "shock treatment" with respect to policy 
change, in part because they believe gradual change is 
politically unfeasible since it will allow time for political 
resistance to mount. An alternative view is that gradual, 
sequenced changes of policies may be both economically more 
efficient and politically more feasible since they will allow 
time for some groups to benefit from the change and provide 
support for further reforms. 
4. The cost or social impact of structural adjustment programs 
has received a great deal of attention. Again a careful 
definition of the problem is needed for adequate assessment. If 
standards of living have dropped one must be careful in 
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attributing that drop to structural adjustment or to the general 
economic crisis which necessitated structural adjustment. One 
must also provide an appropriate standard against which to 
measure standards of living. The living standards of the 1970s 
may not be relevant if they were achieved through unsustainable 
government deficits, borrowing, temporarily high commodity prices 
and so on. 
It is also frequently alleged that the poor have borne a 
disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment because of 
cuts in government services (e.g. health, education, water, 
sanitation). It is further alleged that user fees, as 
recommended by the Bank, will make basic services unaffordable 
for the poor. Here careful comparative analysis is required 
before any conclusions can be drawn. Such services must be paid 
for in one form or another and it is not certain that alternative 
methods will be less regressive. Paying for services out of 
general government revenue is not sustainable if that revenue 
comes from borrowing or printing money. If it comes from 
taxation it is not certain that taxation will have a progressive 
incidence. In most developing countries income tax accounts for 
a negligible proportion of government revenue. Most of it comes 
from export taxes and import duties paid for by producers (often 
peasant farmers) and consumers. One cannot assume a priori that 
the poor would pay a smaller share of the costs through taxation 
than they would through user fees. Furthermore when prices or 
services are kept artificially low, rationing tends to occur. 
There is no guarantee that the poor would obtain access to 
rationed services as freely as the rich, powerful and well 
connected. Kenneth Boulding has said that welfare capitalism is 
a way of subsidizing the rich while making it look as if you are 
subsidizing the poor, an hypothesis which should be kept in mind 
when empirically evaluating the incidence of alternative ways of 
financing social services. 
5. A fifth area of controversy is the overwhelming role of 
prices in structural adjustment programs. These programs rely to 
a large extent on "getting the prices right" to effect structural 
adjustment, assuming that supply will respond automatically and 
efficiently to those price changes. However, in very undeveloped 
countries there are likely to be supply bottlenecks of such 
importance that price increases will not produce the desired 
effects. For example, it is now clear that raising the price of 
any particular crop will produce an increase in supply of that 
crop but may well do so at the expense of another crop. Trying to 
increase total output by increasing prices for all crops is 
unlikely to be effective and may simply lead to inflation. There 
is now greater recognition even within the Bank of the importance 
of Paul Streeten's "six I's", of which incentives are only one. 
(The others are inputs, innovations in technology, information, 
infrastructure and institutions). One disturbing possibility is 
that cutbacks in these areas as a result of SA may have more than 
8 
wiped out the gains from pricing reforms. 
6. The homogeneity of Bank/Fund programs has also prompted 
criticism. A standard recipe tends to be applied to all 
countries regardless of individual circumstances, for several 
reasons. One reason is limited knowledge of the countries' 
differences. A second is the ideological content of the 
programs. A third is a desire to provide a simply recipe which 
is immune to political and administrative problems -in practice 
this means a simplified market solution. A fourth factor is the 
need to avoid the appearance of favouritism when the Bank or Fund 
negotiate agreements with different countries. And finally, it 
must be noted that few countries have provided coherent country- 
specific alternatives to the Bank/Fund programs. If countries 
themselves cannot provide tailor-made programs it is difficult to 
see how external agencies could do better. 
7. Privatization has been another controversial issue and one 
on which there has been some misperception of Bank 
recommendations. In many cases what is termed privatization is 
not necessarily the total withdrawal of the state from a sector. 
In some cases it simply means setting performance criteria for 
public enterprises, or allowing private enterprises to compete 
with public enterprises. 
Evaluation of a privatization program should take into 
account whether or not more competition exists before or after 
the program. For example, does privatization abolish a public 
monopoly, allowing public and private firms to compete? Or does 
it simply transfer ownership of an enterprise from the government 
to a single private owner (who may even be a government 
official)? Privatization should be done carefully on a case by 
case basis with feasibility studies of the private sector's 
capacity and degree of competitiveness. In fact, in the rush to 
develop structural adjustment loans for quick disbursement, such 
careful analysis is rarely done. 
8. Structural adjustment has been criticized for encouraging an 
emphasis on traditional export crops in which developing 
countries have a static comparative advantage. This is said to 
encourage countries to specialize in low technology activities in 
which they compete only through low wages. This is also alleged 
to lead to a "fallacy of composition" in which countries export 
more, creating gluts on the market and thereby reducing prices. 
A vicious circle is created in which countries export more and 
more but earn less and less. 
This argument does not have strong empirical support. In 
fact the most discouraging thing about Africa's export 
performance is that not only the prices but the export volumes 
have dropped and Africa's share in world markets has decreased. 
In many cases African countries have lost market share to Asian 
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countries such as Malaysia which have higher wages. That 
Malaysia can successfully export products in which it does not 
have an obvious comparative advantage, while simultaneously 
providing those producers with incomes substantially higher than 
that of African producers, indicates the benefits that strong 
managerial and technological performance can provide. 
Furthermore, there has been some misreading of the role of 
export crops in a growth strategy. Few people, including those 
in the Bank, would argue that developing countries should 
specialize in simple commodities for the long run. Structural 
adjustment programs are designed as medium-term programs which 
draw on a country's current comparative advantage to earn badly 
needed export revenues and put it back on a growth path. Seen as 
a medium-term transitional device, traditional export crops can 
make a positive contribution. Furthermore, as the Asian 
experience shows, technological progress can keep producer 
countries ahead of price declines. (Prices of computers have 
dropped drastically in real terms over the last ten years but 
computer firms do not complain that the terms of trade have 
moved against them and that they should therefore get out of 
high tech industries.) 
Recent Alternatives 
One recent proposal which could be considered an alternative 
to the traditional Bank/Fund approach is the recent World Bank 
report on Africa "From Crisis to Sustainable Development". This 
report responded to criticism of structural adjustment programs 
by the Bank's Board and a general feeling of pessimism that after 
ten years of structural adjustment lending positive results are 
still difficult to see. The recent report responds to many of 
the criticisms, including some mentioned above. One finds in the 
recent report more emphasis on human resource development, 
protection of social programs, reliance on non-price measures 
including agricultural technology research, regional integration, 
women, environment and community involvement. However, although 
the number of ingredients in the recipe has increased, the cake 
still has a remarkably similar flavour, perhaps because many of 
the measures advocated in each of those areas still reflect the 
same overall Bank philosophy. For example, with respect to 
resource degradation, it is stated that lack of communal land 
tenure does not provide incentives for long run maintenance of 
the resource and that private land ownership should therefore be 
introduced. However, anthropologists have found many cases in 
which community land ownership has led to quite good long-term 
resource management. It is likely that one could find cases of 
both sustainable private ownership or sustainable communal or 
government ownership. Identifying the factors which lead to the 
assignment of long-term value to a resource would be more useful 
than simplistic generalizations about private vs. communal land 
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tenure. 
Another alternative to current Bank/Fund thinking is the 
report from the UN Economic Commission on Africa. This report 
provides a competent critique of the Bank/Fund approach but the 
alternative it presents is disappointing. It closely resembles 
the approaches applied during the sixties and seventies with 
little success. There is a heavy emphasis on subsidies and 
protection but no indication of how these would be applied more 
effectively than they were in the past. There are great many 
cost increases in the program while the only cost decreases would 
come from reducing defence spending. The recommendation that 
African governments democratise and reduce defence expenditures 
is laudable and one with which the Bank and the Fund probably 
agree. The ECA report does not indicate how these changes are to 
come about. Surely it does not recommend that defence spending 
and democracy form part of Bank/Fund conditionality in the 
future. 
Finally, one can mention the alternative stabilization and 
adjustment programs implemented in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. 
These were "heterodox" programs which attempted to combine 
stabilization and adjustment with growth, redistribution of 
income and so on. They were dramatic failures, more spectacular 
than the worst Bank/Fund failures. This experience suggests a 
tempering of criticism of conventional approaches. 
Conclusions 
An obvious topic for discussion here is research priorities. 
This topic has received attention elsewhere and will not receive 
a great deal here. The most obvious area for research is social 
impact but one must be careful of a couple of pitfalls. One is 
the danger of putting too much emphasis on this single aspect of 
structural adjustment. The response from the Bank and the Fund 
can well be "Yes, we agree that the poor have suffered and will 
add the human face to our programs". This leaves unanswered the 
more fundamental questions about the basic assumptions, diagnosis 
and design of conventional structural adjustment programs. In 
fact this is how much of the current debate between CIDA and the 
NGOs is being conducted. The second danger is that neglects the 
importance of investment, something which is less visible, has 
been cut harder than social programs and which has no advocate to 
speak for it. While the short-term effects of structural 
adjustment on the poor are dramatic and visible, the longer-term 
effects on growth may be just as serious while attracting less 
attention. In any case, whatever research is done on social 
impact should be positive. It should not simply demonstrate the, 
existence of poverty, but should propose measures to mitigate it 
which are economically sustainable. 
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Topics which have been somewhat neglected but which merit 
greater attention include global adjustment, technology policy 
and the role of the state. 
A. Global Adjustment 
Structural adjustment has not fully succeeded, in part 
because of its narrow scope and lack of financing. It has been 
restricted so far to developing countries, while to be effective 
global adjustment is needed, especially in world financial 
markets. Structural adjustment programs were based on the 
assumption of much larger capital flows than are currently 
available and it is difficult to see how the programs can 
function properly without enough fuel. Donor countries have not 
kept their promises to provide increased finance in exchange for 
policy reforms (the Brady Plan); protectionism limits the 
opportunities for countries to earn export revenue; foreign 
direct investment in least developing countries is virtually nil; 
and voluntary commercial bank lending ceased some years ago. 
At the same time, the US deficit is absorbing a huge amount 
of the capital available in world markets, driving up world 
interest rates and exacerbating the debt burden. Capital from 
countries such as Japan, Thailand and Korea goes into real 
estate speculation at home and in the U.S. Stock market is 
dominated by mergers and takeovers rather than new productive 
investments and conspicuous consumption by the Donald Trumps and 
Malcolm Forbes reach scandalous proportions. Speculators will 
now pay $60 million for a painting which they can sell for a 
profit six months later. Time magazine reports that Taiwanese 
yuppies are willing to pay $3,500 for a bowl of shark fin soup in 
a five star restaurant. 
This is all highly anecdotal but does seem to indicate a 
distortion of values, and lack of vision. More practically, 
there is a need for financial instruments to channel investment 
capital from surplus to deficit countries. Such quasi-equity 
instruments should combine financial flows with expertise and 
some sharing of performance risk, unlike the unsupervised lending 
of the 1970s or the risk- free conditionality-based loans of the 
Bank and Fund of the 1980s. Creative macro-institutional 
innovations, along with policy co-ordination and macroeconomic 
adjustment in the north, will be needed to achieve adjustment on 
a global scale. 
B. Technology Policy 
If increased investment funds were made available, what 
should they go into? There are several possibilities. One is 
the kind of transitional adjustment mentioned before. In 
developed countries, "adjustment" usually refers to such measures 
as retraining programs, relocation allowances and various other 
12 
compensation payments intended to increase flexibility in labour 
markets and cushion the shocks of a shift from sunset to sunrise 
industries. Little of this is present in structural adjustment 
loans for developing countries and more transitional adjustment 
could have significant benefits. So could investment in 
rehabilitation of existing enterprises as opposed to investment 
in new ones; in export diversification; development of local 
substitutes for imported inputs; infrastructure; and perhaps most 
important, technological innovation. 
It has become increasingly obvious that the least developed 
countries must make substantial technological progress simply to 
keep up with their competitiors in world markets, and even more 
progress to achieve significant growth. Unfortunately, 
structural adjustment, due to its short-term economic management 
orientation, pays little attention to the requirements for 
technological innovation. Many of its effects on local 
technological capacity may well be negative. In the short-term, 
countries will tend to specialize in low technology activities in 
which they have current comparative advantage. Cutbacks in 
government investment projects reduce a major source of demand 
for technology. Governments are also reducing their support to 
research and development institutions, affecting the supply of 
technology. (These institutions are extremely vulnerable to 
cutbacks, as we have seen from the experience of the NRC in 
Canada.) Finally, the overall decline in investment, both 
foreign and domestic, reduces opportunities for technological 
change. Conscious efforts to mitigate these effects and 
maintain technological capacity in a period of crisis are of 
critical importance. 
C. The Role of the State 
The kind of state envisaged in structural adjustment 
programs is a minimal one which provides basic services and laws 
- in general, an enabling environment for the private sector. 
The effects of SA on civil society - the range of associations 
and institutions which lie outside government but which have a 
recognized legitimate role in aggregating and expressing 
interests - are also far reaching but more difficult to foresee. 
Will SA produce a relationship between state and civil society 
that will promote economic development? This, rather than the 
static short run effect on efficiency is the crucial impact of 
structural adjustment. 
It is far from clear that a minimal state will be 
sufficient. The Korean experience suggests that the state has an 
important role to play in identifying a country's dynamic 
comparative advantage, in directing investing towards its 
achievement, and in promoting technological progress. In order 
to play this role effectively, however, the state must be capable 
and autonomous. Prior to structural adjustment, these conditions 
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did not exist in most developing countries, particularly those in 
Africa. Instead the state tended to be weak and was captured by 
very narrow private interests. Policies tended to result from 
lobbying by very specific interests, the result being a 
fragmented and inconsistent policy framework. At the same time, 
society was also weak and fragmented, dominated by the economy of 
affection, while the legitimate and organized expression of 
interests was severely limited or repressed. The powerful 
influenced the state through connections and bribery, the 
powerless influenced it by taking to the streets. 
The state and civil society are not a zero sum game - both 
can and must be strengthened. A strong civil society is 
necessary to openly express competing interests and alternative 
visions of a country's future. A strong state is needed to 
mediate and synthesize those competing demands, to form consensus 
and to implement the actions needed to achieve societal goals. A 
minimal, post-structural adjustment state may be somewhat less 
susceptible to illegitimate societal pressures simply because its 
mandate and resources are reduced and its capacity to respond 
limited by external imposed conditionality. This kind of 
relationship between state, society and external donors may 
minimize the worst excesses of the past, but it has little to 
offer as a positive force for development. 
The effects of structural adjustment on civil society are 
much less clear than its effects on the state. It may lead to an 
atomized society in which economic agents interact only through 
the market place. It may promote the sharpening of class 
differences and their stronger expression. For example, 
commercial farmers may begin to exert more political influence 
and consolidate various advantages they have gained from pricing 
reform. More optimistically, there are signs that interest 
groups are coalescing in Africa along functional rather than 
tribal lines. In some countries, chambers of commerce, farmers' 
associations, and trade unions are becoming involved in policy 
debates over structural adjustment. Given a sufficiently 
informed debate and the opportunity for open expression, the 
result could be greater recognition of the legitimacy of 
interests of other actors and the beginnings of consensus 
formation. Such consensus building under the label 
'concertacibn' has been attempted in Latin America, but is at 
most embryonic in Africa. 
These potential developments are not confined to the 
developing world. They will play a major role in Eastern Europe 
as atomized civil societies emerging from decades of repression 
struggle to reconstitute themselves during a period of traumatic 
economic change. 
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These developments are also of significance to IDRC. An 
informed public debate requires information and the capacity to 
analyze, interpret and synthesize it. This capacity must become 
widely diffused throughout society. It must not be concentrated 
in a few government technocrats, if for no other reason than the 
fact that, in the medium term, the government's mandate, 
resources and freedom of action are shrinking. The traditional 
model of policy impact - researchers targetting highly specific 
policy recommendations to a small group of policy makers - is no 
longer adequate. Researchers must also play a role in improving 
the analytical capacity of civil society's institutions, in 
enriching the quality of public debate, highlighting tradeoffs 
and choices, and contributing to a shared vision of a country's 
dynamic comparative advantage. This is more difficult role than 
generating policy recommendations but an important and necessary 
one. 
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